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1 Introduction 
In terms of the common law, a South African property owner does not have an 
inherent right to the existing view from her property over adjoining properties,1 
although the existing view from her property can be protected with a servitude 
that prevents or restricts building works on adjoining land.
2
 Furthermore, there are 
(weak and inconclusive) indications that the view from a specific property may be 
protected as an inherent part of landownership in exceptional circumstances, where 
the view forms an integral part of the use and enjoyment of the property and where 
the protection of that view was an important consideration in the development 
of land in that area.
3
 Apart from these rather limited circumstances, landowners 
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1 South African law does not recognise an inherent right to the existing view from a property, because 
a beautiful view is considered a mere incidental advantage, and since the recognition of a natural 
right to the view from a property would interfere with neighbouring owners’ rights to build on 
their properties. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (2006) 127; Van der Walt The Law of Neighbours (2010) 357-358. In a series of cases, 
including Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8; Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 
95; Dorland v Smits 2002 5 SA 374 (C); Clark v Faraday 2004 4 SA 564 (C) 575-577; Muller NO v 
City of Cape Town 2006 5 SA 415 (C) par 72-74; De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit (7488/04) 
2006 ZAWCHC 56 (28 Nov 2006) par 36-39; Erasmus NO v Blom (3311/09) 2011 ZAECPEHC (31 
Mar 2011) par 36, the courts have indicated that in terms of the common law, a property owner 
does not have an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view from her property. See also 
Freedman “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in Hoctor and 
Schwikkard (eds) The Exemplary Scholar: Essays in Honour of John Milton (2007) 162-184; Koch 
The Right to a View: Common Law, Legislation and the Constitution (2012 dissertation US) 20-57; 
Van der Walt and Koch 2013 THRHR 696; Van der Walt and Kriek 2015 TSAR 482.
2 In the Erasmus case (n 1) par 36 it was confirmed that in South African law the existing view from 
a property can be protected against lawfully built obstructions only if a negative servitude (either 
a servitus prospectus or a servitus altius non tollendi) is registered to protect such a view, or if 
a restrictive condition or the provisions of a town planning scheme or other building legislation 
prevents such obstruction. See Koch (n 1) 44-47, 76-85.
3 The ruling in Waterhouse Properties CC v Hyperception Properties 572 CC (2194/04) 2004 
ZAFSHC 97 (28 Oct 2004) could be read as implying that the view from a property may in certain 
instances be considered an attribute that forms part of the ordinary use and enjoyment of that 
property. Accordingly, if the surroundings of a specific property are of such a nature that the view 
to or from it is considered more than a mere incidental benefit, one property owner’s right to erect a 
building or structure on her property may be limited to accommodate another owner’s right to have 
an unobstructed view. However, if this is indeed what the decision implies, the court’s reasoning 
appears to be flawed in terms of the South African position with regard to the right to a view (n 1 
above). See Freedman (n 1) 162 184; Koch (n 1) 51-55.
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can generally not claim an inherent right, as part of their ownership, to uphold the 
undisturbed prospect from their land against the wish of neighbouring owners to 
develop and build on their land.
However, case law indicates that property owners often rely (with varying 
degrees of success) on alternative strategies to protect the existing view from their 
properties. These strategies are either based on the enforcement of a substantive 
right to prevent or restrict building on adjoining land, with the indirect effect of 
protecting the existing view, or they are cast in the form of attacks on procedural 
irregularities in approving development or building on neighbouring land, with the 
same effect, albeit temporarily.
Apart from servitudes that prohibit building works or prevent the obstruction 
of specific views, there are other substantive rights, in the form of or based on 
pre-existing property rights, that may entitle landowners to prevent or restrict 
the erection of buildings on neighbouring properties, either permanently or 
temporarily. For instance, every affected property owner is entitled to prevent the 
erection of a building on a neighbouring property if such a building is prohibited by 
a restrictive condition; if the area has to be re-zoned to accommodate the proposed 
building; if the proposed building would depart from the applicable zoning scheme; 
or if legislation creates a right or duty to prevent the erection of such a building. 
Building plans indicating that the proposed building would contravene a restrictive 
condition or applicable legislation; depart from the applicable zoning scheme or 
building regulations;
4
 or require re-zoning of the area may be approved only if 
neighbouring owners have given their prior permission. Therefore, a property 
owner has an inherent right to the existing view from her property insofar as that 
view is protected indirectly in terms of restrictive conditions, the applicable building 
regulations and zoning scheme and any applicable legislation. Her existing view, 
as it exists within the parameters of these “devices”, may only be obstructed by the 
erection of a neighbour’s building if she agrees to such building works.
5
 
Procedural strategies that are used to prevent the erection of a building that would 
obstruct the view from a property are different from the substantive-right strategies 
set out above, to the extent that they are founded purely on irregularities in the 
process of approving the building plans. These strategies involve an attack on either 
a purely procedural shortcoming in the approval process or the decision maker’s 
exercise of its discretion to approve the plans.6
Property owners use these alternative strategies to protect the existing view 
from their properties in the absence of an inherent right to a view. The two main 
categories of alternative strategies (substantive and procedural) are explained and 
assessed in the subsections below in terms of the remedies that they offer and with 
reference to their application in case law.
4 In this article, the phrase “departure from zoning scheme” refers to the subdivision of property, or 
a departure from the zoning scheme in terms of a “consent use”, or a deviation from the applicable 
building regulations. Van Wyk Planning Law (2012) 352-353 defines “consent use” and “departures”. 
5 Strategies based on a substantive right to prevent or restrict building are discussed in 2 below.
6 Purely procedural strategies are examined in 3 below.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 1 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
22 KRIEK AND VAN DER WALT
2 Strategies based on a substantive right to prevent or restrict building
2.1 Basis of the right to prevent or restrict building
A property owner (A) has a substantive right, which flows from her right of 
ownership, to be informed of – and sometimes prevent by withholding consent to – 
a neighbour’s (B’s) building plans when these plans involve the removal or change of 
a restrictive condition;
7
 when the application for the approval of B’s building plans 
includes an application for the re-zoning of B’s property
8
 or for a departure from 
the zoning scheme that affects A’s property;
9 or if the building plans are in conflict 
with any applicable legislation. If A’s substantive right is created by legislation or 
a restrictive condition that prohibits any or a particular form of building on B’s 
property, no building may be erected on B’s property in conflict with that condition 
without A’s consent, unless a state body (the local or provincial government or a 
court) has the authority to qualify or override A’s right to object. If her right is based 
on a restrictive condition, a zoning scheme or building regulations that prohibit the 
erection of buildings in a certain spot, or of a certain height or kind, B may not erect 
any building that would be in conflict with these limitations without allowing A an 
opportunity to object or,
10
 in some cases, without A’s consent.
11
 In some instances, 
a state body such as the local or provincial government or a court can qualify 
or override A’s right to object and if they do, B may erect a building despite A’s 
objections. 
In the absence of permission and unless a building authority or a court overrides 
A’s right to object, the effect can be that although A does not have a right to a view 
as such, she, as the beneficiary of the substantive right, can effectively prevent or 
restrict building on neighbouring land that would interfere with the existing view 
from her property. The protection of this substantive right has been relied on in 
various instances (discussed below) as a strategy to avoid the obstruction of the 
existing view from the beneficiary properties.12 
A substantive right to prevent the erection of a building on a neighbouring 
property can in certain cases amount to an actual veto that prevents any form of 
building. For example, if the substantive right originates in legislation that places 
a duty on a specific landowner (B) not to build (at all or in a specific location or 
manner) on its property, such a person or authority must refrain from any building 
that will interfere with the duty, and the beneficiary (A) can enforce compliance with 
that duty. An example is the National Ports Act 12 of 2005, which determines that 
the National Ports Authority is, inter alia, responsible for maintaining adequate and 
efficient lighthouses to assist in the navigation of ships. This provision places a duty 
on the National Ports Authority to protect the views to lighthouses and therefore 
entitles and compels it to prevent the obstruction of such views by building on any 
7 Van Wyk (n 4) 351, 355, 357, 394, 396. See 2.2.1.
8 See 2.2.2.
9 Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 6 SA 129 (CC) par 130; see Van Wyk (n 4) 354, 357, 396 and cf 
2.2.3.
10 An application for the re-zoning of land; a departure from the applicable zoning scheme; or the 
removal of a restrictive condition in terms of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 may not 
be granted if affected property owners have not been informed of the application and have not been 
given an opportunity to object.
11 A restrictive condition may not be removed in terms of the common law if its beneficiaries have not 
granted their permission; see 2.2.1.
12 See the discussion of Richardson v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 3 BCLR 265 (C); the Muller 
case (n 1); Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties 2008 ZAECHC 155 (5 Sep 2008) in 2.2. 
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property in the vicinity of lighthouses. In this case the effect of the substantive 
right is that no building may be erected without the right holder’s (the National Ports 
Authority’s) approval and the right holder has an absolute right to prohibit the erection 
of any buildings that may interfere with the visibility of a lighthouse.
13
 Although it is 
in principle possible that the right holder can give permission for building works in 
conflict with this duty, it is unlikely that such permission would be granted, and (in 
the absence of impropriety) it is equally unlikely that another state body would ever 
be able to qualify or override the Port Authority’s right to object. In this case, the right 
to prevent building on B’s land is therefore an absolute veto. It stands to reason that 
other private property owners whose existing view might have been compromised by 
a particular building may benefit indirectly from enforcement of the Port Authority’s 
statutory obligation to prevent or restrict that building.
However, a substantive right to prohibit the erection of a building on a neighbouring 
property would not necessarily veto all building on the neighbouring property, 
since such a right may be subject to qualification or removal. If the substantive right 
originates in zoning legislation, it can be qualified or removed by the responsible 
local authority (or by a court) in terms of the same legislation.
14
 If it originates 
in a restrictive condition, it may be qualified or removed by a court or, in some 
instances, by the responsible planning authority.
15
 However, in some instances it is 
more difficult to remove or qualify a substantive right to prevent building against 
the beneficiary’s will than in others. If the right to prevent building on neighbouring 
land originates in an agreement that had been registered as a limited real right 
(restrictive covenants and certain categories of restrictive conditions) it is more 
unusual and therefore more difficult to have the right removed or qualified, while 
rights that originate in planning legislation (building regulations) can be qualified 
or overridden more easily.
16 Irrespective of whether such a right is qualified or 
removed by a court or a local authority, removal or qualification of the right will be 
possible only if it is in the public interest to do so (for example to remove a restrictive 
covenant with a racially discriminatory foundation), and not merely to benefit the 
owner wanting to build.
17 Because the beneficiary has a substantive right, she may 
13 See the discussion of the Transnet case (n 12) in 2.2.4.
14 In the Richardson case (n 12) 268 the court qualified property owners’ right to prevent the erection of 
buildings on a neighbouring property, ruling that although the beneficiaries of the substantive right 
did not consent to the subdivision of their neighbour’s property, approval of the subdivision should 
not be set aside. However, it ordered that the responsible local authority should consider imposing 
height limitations on current and future buildings on the subdivided property. The beneficiaries’ 
substantive right did therefore not amount to a veto of their neighbour’s building works. See 2.2.2.
15 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 354-356; Van Wyk (n 4) 345 351.
16 See 2.2.1 on the removal of restrictive conditions. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 354 argue 
that a restrictive covenant can be modified or removed by agreement, since it is created by agreement. 
17 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 356, referring to Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents 
Association v Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration, Western Cape 2001 4 SA 294 (C); 
Hayes v Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Western Cape 2003 4 SA 598 (C), explain 
that an application for the removal of restrictions lodged with the premier may be granted only if it 
serves a positive advantage, such as the public interest, and that the applicant’s personal interest in 
such an application is irrelevant. They reason that proper notice of such an application must be given 
to all neighbouring owners who will be directly affected by its approval, to avoid procedurally unfair 
administrative action. In Nowers NO v Burmeister (1038/08) 2011 ZAECELLC 8 (2 Aug 2011) par 
50-51 the court established that zoning schemes are aimed at protecting community interests. Van 
der Walt 2011: 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review par 2 3 2 argues that the court in the Nowers case upheld 
counterclaims involving alleged unlawful building works on the ground that courts have a duty to 
enforce compliance with the requirements set out in zoning schemes and other planning legislation 
because these legislative measures protect the rights of others.
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in any event be entitled to attack a qualification or removal of her right in terms of 
section 25 of the constitution.
18
Strategies to protect the existing view from a property that are based on substantive 
rights to prevent or restrict building often feature only once a building project 
has started. The principle is that the beneficiary has a right to object or that prior 
permission should be obtained before the building plans are approved, but building 
permission is sometimes granted without prior consultation, and then the beneficiary 
of the right to prevent building may be forced to attack the granting of building 
approval on procedural grounds. When approval is granted for a building that would 
contravene a restrictive condition, the affected neighbour’s attack on the approval of 
the building plans would typically focus on the administrative blunder in granting 
building approval without obtaining the prior consent of affected neighbours. This 
could create confusion of the substantive with the purely procedural strategies, but it 
is important to distinguish between them. If an objection against a building project 
that has already started is based on a pre-existing substantive right that entitles the 
objecting property owner to veto (or at least object against) approval of the building 
plans, the attack should focus on the fact that the administrative decision (approval 
of the building plans) has been taken in conflict with a substantive property right. 
Purely procedural strategies arise when there is no substantive right to prohibit 
building in the first place, but an administrative error was made in the granting of 
permission to build generally, for example if there was no building control officer 
employed (as is required) when the responsible local authority approved the plans.
19
 
Consequently, if the approval of building plans is attacked on the basis of a purely 
procedural irregularity, the attack can focus only on the administrative irregularity 
in the process of approving the plans, because there is no substantive right (apart 
from the right that procedures be followed) underlying the attack.
20
18 Van Wyk (n 4) 356, referring to Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 2 SA 136 (C), explains 
that a restrictive condition is considered “property” for purposes of s 25(1) of the constitution, since 
it is classified as a praedial servitude. The removal of a restrictive condition therefore amounts to a 
deprivation of property in terms of s 25(1). See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 355-356; cf 
2.2.1 below.
19 In Paola v Jeeva NO 2004 1 SA 396 (SCA) the respondent’s building plans were approved at a time 
when there was no building control officer employed by the responsible local authority that approved 
the plans. The plans were therefore approved in conflict with s 5(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (building act). See 3.2.1 below.
20 The confusion between how and where the two different strategies apply is apparent from decisions 
such as the Walele case (n 9) and True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Mahdi 2009 4 SA 153 (SCA). These cases 
appear to concern purely procedural battles, but in fact there are two issues involved in both of them. 
The first is whether permission to build was granted in conflict with a substantive right: although the 
attack on the approval of the building plans has an administrative basis (namely an administrator’s 
decision to approve building plans), it actually concerns a substantive right because the building 
permission was granted without obtaining the necessary consent, in a situation where such consent 
was required. The second question is whether s 7 of the building act creates a substantive right (in 
addition to the other substantive rights mentioned earlier) to prevent building on a neighbouring 
property. The conflicting decisions in the Walele and True Motives cases adopted different points 
of view regarding the latter question. In Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Court Municipality 2014 6 
SA 592 (CC) the constitutional court upheld its Walele interpretation of s 7(2)(b) and rejected the 
conflicting interpretation of the supreme court of appeal in the True Motives case, holding that it is 
not unjustifiably burdensome on either the local authority or the developing owner to expect the local 
authority to reject building plans when it is uncertain whether a completed building (that otherwise 
complies with all legal requirements) might trigger any of the disqualifying factors (including 
derogating of the value of neighbouring properties). This decision arguably confirms the existence 
of an additional, statutory substantive right to prevent or restrict building on neighbouring land.
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2.2 Application
2.2.1 Restrictive conditions
A restrictive condition can create a substantive right to prevent (or at least object 
against) the erection of buildings on neighbouring property that would affect an 
existing view from the dominant property.21 Restrictive conditions can, for example, 
prohibit any building; restrict the erection of buildings within a specific distance from 
the street line; impose height restrictions on buildings; limit the area of a property 
that may be built on; or restrict the use of a property to a single-storey dwelling.
22
 
Since building works that contravene a restrictive condition are unlawful,
23
 these 
limitations may indirectly result in effective, substantive protection of the existing 
view from the beneficiary’s property.24 
Protection of the existing view from a property in terms of a restrictive condition 
can be limited or forfeited only if the neighbouring owner who is prevented from 
building in terms of the restrictive condition successfully applies for the amendment, 
qualification or removal of the condition. However, the interests of the beneficiaries 
of such a restrictive condition are protected against unwanted alteration or removal 
of such a condition, and it is unlikely that conditions of this nature will be removed 
or amended purely for the benefit of an affected owner who wants to build.25 
In Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC
26
 the court decided that, in order to 
comply with the constitutional requirements for a valid deprivation of property, the 
removal of restrictive conditions in terms of the common law must be accompanied 
by effective notice to affected neighbours and may not be granted without the 
consent of all the affected parties.27 Restrictive conditions can also be amended 
or removed in terms of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 (removal act), 
21 Van Wyk (n 4) 309 refers to restrictive conditions as “conditions registered in title deeds during 
the process of township establishment by the township developer in terms of which restrictions are 
placed on the use of land, separte from town planning or land use schemes”.
22 Van Wyk (n 4) 68, 306-307. 
23 See Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO; Naidoo NO v Van Rensburg NO 2011 4 SA 149 (SCA) par 
18; Van Wyk (n 4) 315. See also Resnekov v Cohen 2012 1 SA 314 (WCC), which concerned an 
(applicant’s) attempt to enforce a restrictive condition that restricted the use of a (respondent’s) 
neighbouring property to a single-storey dwelling, protecting the existing view from the applicant’s 
property. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s case on the basis that the condition was a 
personal servitude that only benefitted the person who owned the property when the condition was 
inserted. This indicates that the effectiveness of a restrictive condition may be affected by the way 
in which the condition is interpreted. See Van Wyk (n 4) 68-69.
24 In the Myburgh case (n 1) 8, a condition in the transfer deed of a property prohibited the erection of 
buildings that would obstruct the view from a specific adjacent property. 
25 The consent of the beneficiaries of a restrictive condition is required for the removal or amendment 
of such a condition if it is removed or amended in terms of the common law, while the removal or 
modification of a restrictive condition in terms of the provisions of the Removal of Restrictions Act 
84 of 1967 is allowed only if the beneficiaries of the condition had the opportunity to object.
26 (n 18).
27 The Optimal Property Solutions case (n 18) par 4-6, 19-20. The court ruled that restrictive title deed 
conditions are similar in character to reciprocal praedial servitudes; that the registration of such 
servitutal rights and obligations amounts to the creation of real rights in property; and that the loss 
of property rights due to the removal of a restrictive condition amounts to a deprivation of property 
in terms of s 25(1) of the constitution. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 355-356.
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in which case consent of affected property owners is not required.28 Nevertheless, 
the removal act prescribes procedures to safeguard affected owners’ rights to 
be informed of and to object to applications for the amendment or removal of 
restrictive conditions that affect their land.29 Therefore, as was established in Ex 
parte Optimal Property Solutions CC, restrictive conditions create property rights 
that, according to the requirements for the removal or amendment of a restrictive 
condition in terms of either the common law or the removal act, may be removed 
only if affected property owners have at least been given an opportunity to object. A 
restrictive condition that prevents a property owner from building in a manner that 
would obstruct the existing view from a neighbouring property therefore confers a 
substantive right on the neighbouring owner that indirectly protects her view to the 
extent that she can enforce the restrictive condition. The possibility of removing or 
amending a restrictive condition does not derogate from the substantive protection 
that is provided by a restrictive condition, since a condition may not be removed 
or amended without giving affected property owners an opportunity to object. 
Arguably, the negative effect that removal of the restriction and ensuing building 
on the neighbouring land may have on their properties (including removal of the 
existing view) may in certain circumstances be a relevant consideration in the 
adjudication of their objections.
2.2.2 Re-zoning of land
In the Walele decision, O’Regan ADCJ confirmed that neighbours have a right to 
be consulted when an application for the re-zoning of land is considered.
30
 She 
argued that a zoning scheme limits an owner’s right of ownership, but also gives an 
owner the right to expect other neighbours to comply with the scheme. Therefore, if 
a property owner wants to use her property within the parameters of the applicable 
zoning scheme, the rights of neighbouring owners are not materially affected 
and they do not have to be consulted or heard during the approval of the plans. 
However, if a property owner submits building plans that require a departure from 
the scheme, or if the land has to be re-zoned to make approval possible, the rights of 
neighbouring owners are negatively affected and they are entitled to be heard before 
the plans are approved.
31
 If a zoning scheme has the indirect effect of protecting the 
existing view from an owner’s property, she has a substantive right to prevent the 
obstruction of such a view by building on a neighbouring property in the sense that 
she may expect her neighbours to comply with the zoning scheme and she may have 
28 In the Optimal Property Solutions case (n 18) par 21 the court explained that the removal act “enables 
the administrative amendment or deletion of title deed restrictions”. The court reasoned that this 
statute is law of general application for purposes of s 25 of the constitution that allows a limitation 
of a praedial servitude holder’s common law rights to the extent that it does not require the consent 
of affected owners for such an amendment or deletion. 
29 S 2(1)(aa) and (dd), read together with s 2(4)(a)-(c), 3(6), 5(2)(b)(ii), 5(4) of the removal act, 
determine that affected persons shall be informed of the proposed alteration, suspension or removal 
of a restriction or obligation that is applicable to a landowner in terms of a restrictive condition. In 
effect, these provisions confer a right on an affected owner who is the beneficiary of such a condition 
to be informed of an application for the amendment or removal of a restrictive condition. If such an 
amendment or removal is approved without notice being given in the way prescribed by s 2(4) of this 
act, an affected owner is entitled to appeal. In the Optimal Property Solutions case (n 18) par 21 the 
court reasoned that the removal act requires the relevant state functionary “to consider what service 
should be effected on affected property owners”. See Van Wyk (n 4) 330, 333-335. 
30 the Walele case (n 9) par 130.
31 the Walele case (n 9) par 130, 136. See Van Wyk (n 4) 354, 357, 396.
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the right to be informed of and to object when her neighbours apply for departure 
from the zoning scheme or the re-zoning of their land. 
The applicants in Richardson v South Peninsula Municipality
32
 attacked the 
approval of a subdivision of the second respondent’s property on the ground that the 
approval process did not comply with the provisions of section 24(2)(a) of the Land 
Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985, since the local authority approved the plans 
without advertising the subdivision that was involved in approval of the plans.
33
 The 
applicants therefore had a substantive right
34
 that, if enforced successfully, would 
indirectly prevent the erection of buildings that would obstruct the existing view 
from their property.
35
 The second respondent opposed this application, arguing 
that the applicants acquired the property only after the impugned resolution was 
adopted and that they were therefore not “affected persons” in terms of section 
24(2)(a) of ordinance 15 of 1985 at the time when the decision was taken. The court 
rejected this argument and held that an owner’s right to apply for appropriate relief 
when she is affected by unlawful and procedurally unfair administrative action is 
incidental to the right of ownership. Therefore, the right to apply for appropriate 
relief against unjust administrative action is transferred with the ownership of 
property.
36 The court ruled that the first respondent’s failure to advertise the proposed 
subdivision amounted to a breach of its duty to ensure lawful and procedurally fair 
administrative action, because it deprived persons who could be adversely affected 
32 (n 12) 268.
33 S 24(1) and (2)(a) of the ordinance deals with the application for subdivision of property and provides 
as follows:
  “24(1) An owner of land may apply in writing for the granting of a subdivision under section 25 to 
the town clerk or secretary as the case may be. (2) The said town clerk or secretary shall – (a) cause 
the said application to be advertised if in his opinion any person may be adversely affected thereby”. 
 In the Richardson case (n 12) 272 Yekiso AJ reasoned that the use of the word “shall” in s 24(2) of 
the ordinance indicates that the provisions in this subsection are peremptory and not permissive; 
see Van der Walt (n 1) 364 n 107. He held that the local authority’s (first respondent’s) failure 
to advertise the application for the approval for subdivision meant that it was not following the 
procedure prescribed in s 24(2)(a) of the ordinance. Referring to the constitutional principle of 
just administrative action and emphasising the importance of administrative legality, Yekiso AJ 
concluded that the process leading to the approval of the resolution was unlawful. This meant that 
a right to challenge the validity of the administrative decision accrued to the persons who were 
adversely affected.
34 This substantive right is the right of neighbours and other affected owners to have an opportunity to 
object to an application for subdivision, as provided for in s 24 of the ordinance. 
35 The Richardson case (n 12) 268 269. The existing view from the trust’s property was the principal 
reason why the trustees had bought it. Although the applicants never proposed the potential 
obstruction of the view from their property as a cause of action, they clearly aimed to protect this 
view, stating in their affidavit that the loss of this “spectacular” view would cause a derogation of 
their property. 
36 the Richardson case (n 12) 274 275. The right of action accrued to the applicants’ predecessor in title 
as an “affected person” in terms of s 24(2)(a) of the ordinance; as purchasers of the property, the 
applicants now had this right of action. The previous owner had the rights to lawful and procedurally 
fair administrative action in terms of s 24 of the interim constitution 200 of 1993 (applicable at the 
time) and, in terms of s 7(4) of the interim constitution, the right to have standing to apply to an 
appropriate court if these rights were infringed upon. These rights were considered incidental to 
ownership and therefore transferred to the applicants when ownership of the property passed. See 
Van der Walt (n 1) 364.
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by such an application of the right to object or make representations.
37
 However, 
the court considered an order setting aside approval of the subdivision to be an 
inappropriate remedy.
38
 Instead, it ordered that the matter should be remitted to 
the first respondent to consider imposing height restrictions on present and future 
buildings on the subdivided land.
39 Van der Walt sees this decision as an example 
of courts’ “willingness to consider a compromise” if the illegality of a building is 
the result of a “bona fide mistake or oversight”.40 He argues that the applicants had 
an opportunity to protect the view from their property indirectly, because of an 
irregularity in the approval of subdivision.
41
 It should be clear, however, that the 
objection in this case (although it was focused on the right to just administrative 
action) was based on a substantive right to be informed of and to object against the 
subdivision, and not purely on an administrative oversight.
In the Walele case it was established that a property owner may expect her 
neighbours to comply with the applicable zoning scheme. This was confirmed in 
the Richardson judgment, which showed that a property owner is entitled to be 
informed of and to comment on or object against an application for a re-zoning. A 
property owner may therefore rely on the protection of the existing view from her 
property insofar as the applicable zoning scheme prevents a neighbouring owner 
from erecting buildings that will interfere with that view, since she has a substantive 
right to enforce compliance with, or at least to object against the amendment of such 
a scheme. The Richardson decision also indicates that a successor in title who wishes 
to rely on a substantive right to prevent building as a way to protect the view from 
her property has the right to do so, because the right to lawful and procedurally fair 
administrative action is inherent to the ownership of land and is therefore acquired 
by a successor in title.
42
 
2.2.3 Departure from a zoning scheme
In Muller NO v City of Cape Town,43 the applicants succeeded with an application 
for the review and setting aside of a neighbour’s approved building plans, on the 
ground that these plans contravened the applicable zoning scheme.
44
 The plans 
provided for alterations to a building that would, once constructed, obstruct the 
view from the applicants’ property. The applicants showed that the first respondent 
should not have approved the plans, since the proposed building would exceed the 
37 the Richardson case (n 12) 272 275. The local authority’s decision to dispense with the advertising of 
the subdivision application contravened s 24(2)(a) of ordinance 15 of 1985. S 24(2)(a) requires that an 
application for subdivision should be advertised, whereas s 24(2)(b) makes provision for the owner 
who seeks subdivision to comment on the recommendations and objections of persons that might be 
affected by the proposed subdivision.
38 the Richardson case (n 12) 277. The court held that an order to set aside the approval for subdivision 
would cause immense financial consequences for the parties involved because a substantial amount 
of money had been spent in the course of developing the erven since the subdivision of the original 
erf had been approved.
39 the Richardson case (n 12) 278.
40 Van der Walt (n 1) 350.
41 Van der Walt (n 1) 349, 364.
42 Van der Walt (n 1) 364.
43 (n 1).
44 the applicants were co-trustees of a trust that owned immovable property in Bloubergstrand. The 
building plans, approved by the first respondent local authority, provided for the alteration and 
extension of the existing house on the directly adjoining property of the second respondent, a close 
corporation.
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lawful height restriction;
45
 would derogate from the value of their property;
46
 and 
because they, as affected owners, were denied an opportunity to see and object 
to the plans.
47
 On the supposition that the neighbour would comply with the 
applicable zoning requirements and specifically the prescribed height limitation, 
the applicants were unconcerned when their neighbour commenced with alterations 
to the existing buildings on its property. However, when the building works reached 
what the applicants considered an unacceptable height, they caused investigations 
to be conducted into the approval of their neighbour’s building plans.
48
 They 
discovered that the local authority that approved the plans used the wrong method 
for determining the height that the building works would reach and that it therefore 
did not realise that the proposed alterations would cause the buildings to exceed 
the height restriction laid down in the zoning scheme.
49 Building works that exceed 
the prescribed height limitation constitute a departure from the applicable zoning 
scheme. Neighbouring owners have a right to be informed of and to object to 
building plans that propose such a departure.
50
 The applicants, who were denied the 
opportunity to see and object to the plans, therefore had a substantive right to attack 
their approval. Consequently, they had the opportunity indirectly to protect the 
45 the Muller case (n 1) par 27, 31, 36. The applicants contended that the building plans contravened 
s 7(1)(a) of the building act because the proposed building works would exceed the lawful height 
limitation. The height limitation was prescribed by zoning scheme regulations that were considered 
to be “any other applicable law”. Non-compliance with this limitation implied that the plans did not 
comply with s 7(1) of the act, in terms of which building plans must comply with applicable law.
46 the Muller case (n 1) par 32. The applicants argued that the obstruction of the view from their 
property would mean that the building plans were unlawfully approved, since s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) 
of the building act provides that a local authority shall refuse to approve an application for building 
plans if it is satisfied that the proposed building will probably or in fact derogate from the value 
of adjoining or neighbouring properties. According to the applicants, obstructing the view from 
their property would cause its value to decrease and therefore, in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), the 
local authority should not have approved the plans. The Muller case is interesting not because it 
confirms that building plans should not be approved when they may result in interference with a 
neighbour’s enjoyment of her property and consequently cause the property to depreciate, but as an 
example of a substantive right (based on a certain interpretation of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc)) that allows a 
landowner indirectly to prevent the erection of buildings that would obstruct the existing view from 
her property.
47 the Muller case (n 1) par 5, 20, 33, 62, 68, 76. The applicants argued that they were denied an 
opportunity to object to or comment on the relevant plans, despite the fact that the first respondent 
initially advised them that they would have such an opportunity. The local authority considered the 
plans to be compliant with the applicable zoning scheme regulations. The court held that the approval 
of the plans without giving the applicants an opportunity to object or comment, in circumstances 
where they ought to have been given such an opportunity, was procedurally unfair and ruled that 
the plans were wrongly approved. The applicants’ complaint that they were not given notice of the 
application for the approval of the plans does not seem to be based on the ground that the plans’ 
departure from the relevant zoning scheme entitled them to an opportunity to be heard. Instead, it 
is based on the reasoning that they should have been given an opportunity to be heard because the 
potential effect that the proposed construction would have on the amenity enjoyed on the applicants’ 
property was evident. 
48 the Muller case (n 1) par 11.
49 the Muller case (n 1) par 55, 57, 58, 61, 64, 67, 68. The zoning scheme regulations that applied to 
the property expressly provided a method for measuring a building’s height. However, this method 
was not used by the local authority when it considered the second respondent’s building plans, and 
the use of an incorrect method to determine the height of the proposed constructions constituted 
a formal shortcoming in the approval process. The Muller decision is also discussed in 3.2 as an 
example of a case of a formal shortcoming in the approval of building plans stalling the erection of 
a building that would obstruct the existing view from a neighbouring property.
50 See 2.1 for a discussion of a neighbouring owner’s right to be heard when building plans that depart 
from the applicable zoning scheme are considered for approval.
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view from their property, either temporarily or permanently. If the approval of their 
neighbour’s building plans was reviewed but confirmed to be lawful, the existing 
view from their property would only have been protected for the time that it took for 
the appeal proceedings to be conducted. However, if the applicants could indicate 
that there were sufficient reasons why the plans should not have been approved and 
should never be approved, the approval would be set aside permanently. The court 
held that there indeed were enough reasons indicating that the plans should not have 
been approved.
51
 Consequently, the applicants succeeded in having the approval 
of their neighbour’s building plans set aside, thereby permanently preventing the 
construction of unlawful buildings that would obstruct the existing view from their 
property. Their view was therefore indirectly protected insofar as the applicable 




2.2.4 Legislation prohibiting building works
The decision in Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties
53
 introduced the possibility 
of using “statutory duty” as a basis for the (possibly permanent and absolute) 
indirect protection of an existing view. In terms of section 74 of the National Ports 
Act, the National Ports Authority is, inter alia, responsible for maintaining adequate 
and efficient lighthouses to assist in the navigation of ships. Development of the 
first respondent’s property posed a threat to the applicant’s duty to assist in the 
navigation of ships because the finished building works would have the effect of 
51 In the Muller case (n 1) par 76-78, the court concluded that the decision to approve the building 
plans was in contravention of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act, reasoning that s 7(1)(b)(ii)
(aa)(ccc) prohibits the approval of building plans if their execution will probably or in fact cause a 
decrease in the value of a neighbouring property. The execution of the building plans in the Muller 
case would have resulted in building works that exceeded the height limitation and obstructed the 
view from the applicants’ property. The court therefore concluded that the first respondent failed to 
have regard to the provisions of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) when it approved the plans. If it did consider this 
provision, it would have realised that the value of the applicants’ property would decrease, because 
the part of the building work that would have exceeded the height limitation would obstruct the 
view from the applicants’ property. The approval of the building plans was declared invalid, since 
it did not comply with the procedure set out in s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc). Van der Walt (n 1) 369 argues 
that the decision in the Muller case is case-specific “to the effect that a decision to approve building 
plans that had been taken in a procedurally invalid manner and that allow for deviations from the 
applicable legislative and regulatory framework should be invalidated and set aside if the affected 
owner can show that the building, once completed, would detract from the value of her property”. 
The decision therefore indicates that the approval of building plans that would cause a decrease 
in the value of a neighbouring property may be set aside if it was procedurally invalid or if the 
plans departed from the applicable legislation or zoning scheme. Van der Walt emphasises that the 
approval of building plans will be set aside only on the ground that they will cause a decrease in the 
value of a neighbouring property (in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act), if there was 
an irregularity in the approval process, or if the plans do not comply with applicable legislation and 
regulations. Therefore, the Muller ruling does not imply that s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the act prohibits 
the approval of building plans purely because they will result in the erection of a building that will 
obstruct the view from a neighbouring property. 
52 In Capendale v Municipality of Saldanha Bay, Capendale v 12 Main St, Langebaan (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 
All SA 33 (WCC), the applicants also relied on an alternative strategy to protect the existing views 
from their properties, based on the substantive right to comment on a neighbour’s building plans 
when such plans involve a departure from the applicable zoning scheme. They successfully attacked 
the plans for non-compliance with the relevant height limitation. In this case, the local municipality’s 
approval of the building plans and specifically the method for determining the height of the proposed 
building was in dispute. See par 6-7, 15-16, 77, 80.
53 (n 12).
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obstructing a lighthouse signal. The court considered the applicant’s statutory duty 
to operate and maintain the lighthouse as an indication of the fact that it had a clear 
right not to have the view to the lighthouse signal obstructed.
54
 The statute therefore 
created a (substantive) legal right or duty to keep the line of sight to the lighthouse 
clear. Accordingly, the applicant was entitled (and obliged) to prevent neighbouring 
owners from building in a way that would obstruct the view to its property.
55
 This 
judgment shows that courts may be willing to recognise that a property owner has a 
substantive right to an unobstructed view if she has a statutory obligation to protect 
a direct line-of-view to or from a specific property.56 
2.3 Remedies 
The existing view from a property is protected at least insofar as building 
regulations, the applicable zoning scheme and restrictive conditions prevent the 
erection of buildings that may obstruct it. Therefore, in a situation where a property 
owner plans to erect or has erected a building that does not comply with these 
requirements or limitations, neighbouring owners have a right to be informed of 
and to object to the departure. The Muller decision
57
 shows that in instances where a 
substantive right is relied on to prevent building works that do not comply with these 
limitations, the existing view from a property may be protected to the extent that 
the applicable building regulations, zoning scheme or restrictive conditions prohibit 
building works that would interfere with the view. When a procedural irregularity 
that results in unlawful building is attributable to a bona fide mistake or oversight, 
courts will probably attempt to reach a compromise to ensure that neighbours’ 
interests are (at least partly) protected, despite the fact that they had not been 
given an opportunity to comment on or object against the plans before they were 
approved. In the Richardson case,
58
 the building plans that involved subdivision 
of a property did not have to be approved anew to enforce affected owners’ right 
to be heard, but their interest in preventing the subdivision, namely that it would 
result in the erection of buildings that would obstruct the view from their property, 
was nevertheless protected to the extent that the court ordered the relevant local 
authority to consider imposing height restrictions on existing and future buildings 
on the subdivided land.
59
 Such height limitations would prevent the obstruction of 
the existing view from the affected neighbours’ property.
Furthermore, the Transnet judgment
60
 indicates that in instances where a 
property owner has a statutory right or duty to protect the undisturbed view to or 
from her property, courts may enforce such a right or duty even if it would prevent 
54 the Transnet case (n 12) par 11 13.
55 This case is distinguishable from the other cases discussed in this article because it involves the 
obstruction of the view to, and not from, a property. Nevertheless, it corresponds with the other cases 
in the sense that it concerns the right to protect an existing, unobstructed view against obstruction 
caused by another owner’s building works.
56 Van der Walt (n 1) 373 discusses the Transnet case in the context of case law on sunlight, natural 
light, the free flow of air and privacy. He considers direct line-of-sight views, together with access 
to direct sunlight and free flow of air, to play an important role in the modern use of land for sun or 
wind power and contends that lighthouse signals rely on direct line-of-sight views. He argues that 
the modern uses of views require a reconsideration of the Roman-Dutch law conception that a view 
is only an incidental advantage of landownership. 
57 See the discussion of the Muller case (n 1) in 2.2.3.
58 The Richardson case (n 12), discussed in 2.2.2.
59 the Richardson case (n 12) 278. See Van der Walt (n 1) 349-350. 
60 (n 12), discussed in 2.2.4.
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neighbouring owners from exercising their right to develop their properties within 
the parameters provided by restrictive conditions, zoning schemes and building 
regulations.
Therefore, a property owner (A) can prevent or restrict building works on a 
neighbour’s (B’s) land that would obstruct the existing view from A’s property, 
relying on a substantive right in terms of which she is entitled to be informed of, to 
comment on, or to consent to the building plans. In some cases, A’s right to object 
can amount to a veto,
61
 while in other instances her objection may be overruled or 
amended by a court
62
 or by a local authority.
63
 If A insists on having an opportunity 
to see, object against or consent prior to approval of B’s building plans, courts will 
enforce A’s right to see, object or consent to the plans if approval of the plans involves 
removal or amendment of a restrictive condition, amendment of the existing zoning 
scheme or compliance with statutory duties or obligations. Accordingly, they have 
to ensure that the correct procedure is followed, implying that the approval process 
has to be repeated and that this time around neighbours have to be informed of 
the application and must be given an opportunity to see, comment and, in some 
cases, to consent to the proposed building plans. If the neighbours provide sufficient 
reasons why the plans should not be approved, for example why the applicable 
zoning scheme should not be departed from, or if they reasonably refuse consent 
to the approval, the obstruction of the views from their properties will be prevented 
permanently. If they do not provide sufficient reasons, or if they are not entitled to 
veto the approval, the plans may be approved against their objections, possibly with 
qualifications or restrictions. In the latter instance, the neighbours could at least 
succeed in temporarily stalling building works that would obstruct their views until 
the plans are properly approved. 
3 Procedural strategies
3.1 Basis of procedural strategies to prevent building
Case law indicates that South African property owners sometimes rely on provisions 
in the building act to prevent the erection of buildings on neighbouring land in 
instances where they do not have substantive rights to prevent such building works, 
for instance because the proposed building complies with and does not depart from 
existing legislation, the zoning scheme or restrictive conditions.64 These strategies 
rely purely on procedural shortcomings in the process of considering and granting 
permission to build to prevent, or at least delay, building works that would obstruct 
an existing view. Section 5(1), read together with sections 6(1) and 7(1) of the 
building act, for example requires that a building control officer must be appointed 
and compels a local authority to consider such an officer’s recommendations in the 
process of approving building plans. If a building plan has been approved without 
complying with the obligatory provisions set out in sections 5(1), 6(1) and 7(1), the 
irregularity in the administrative process through which the plans were approved 
61 Instances where an affected owner may prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property 
are discussed in 2.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.4.
62 See 2.2.1.
63 A’s objections would, for example, be overruled by a local authority if it grants B’s application for a 
departure from the relevant zoning scheme despite A’s objections.
64 Paola v Jeeva NO 2002 2 SA 391 (D); the SCA decision in the Paola case (n 19); the Clark case (n 1); 
the De Kock case (n 1); Ramdass NO v Ethekwini Municipality (11971/13) 2014 ZAKZDHC 27 (17 
June 2014) are examples.
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would render such a decision (approval) unlawful. An attack on the approval 
procedure could thus be used to frustrate or delay the erection of building works that 
might interfere with an existing view, even though the objector had no substantive 
right to be informed of or object against approval of the plans.
The procedural strategies often rely on section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act, 
which provides a list of factors that, if present, would disqualify building plans 
from approval.
65
 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) specifically directs a local authority to 
refuse to approve an application for building plans if it is satisfied that the erection of 
the proposed building “will probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining 
or neighbouring properties”. This provision gives a local authority a discretionary 
power and has been relied on to attack the approval of building plans that would allow 
the erection of buildings that are otherwise completely lawful, but would interfere 
with the existing views from the objector’s property. Two different strategies based 
on these provisions in the building act have been employed in purely procedural 
attempts indirectly to protect hitherto undisturbed views.
One strategy is to contest the approval of building plans on the basis of irregularities 
in the approval process. Such irregularities may include instances where a property 
owner builds without any building plans; where a building is constructed in terms of 
building plans, but the plans have not been approved properly or in accordance with 
the applicable zoning scheme; or where there are properly approved building plans, 
but the buildings are not constructed according to the approved plans. If one of these 
procedural irregularities occurs, the erection of the building or structure is unlawful 
and the construction can thus be delayed through a procedural attack on the approval 
process. However, these procedural irregularities can usually be corrected if the 
plans are resubmitted and the correct approval procedure is followed. Therefore, 
the success of such a purely procedural attack on the approval of building plans that 
would allow the construction of buildings that will interfere with an existing view 
is mostly temporary. 
A second strategy in which the provisions of the building act are relied on to 
prevent the construction of building works is where an owner questions the exercise 
of a discretion by a decision maker who approves building plans that, once executed, 
would obstruct the existing views from her property. When a litigant attacks a 
decision maker’s discretion in an attempt to protect the existing view from her 
property, she would typically argue that the view from her property contributes to 
the property’s market value and that the decision maker was therefore, in terms of 
section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), obliged to refuse the approval of the building plans that 
proposed the erection of buildings that would obstruct such a view and therefore 
derogate from the value of her property.
66
 This argument might seem to suggest 
65 S 7(1) of the building act reads as follows: “7. Approval by local authorities in respect of erection of 
buildings. (1) If a local authority, having considered a recommendation referred to in section 6(1)(a) – 
(a) Is satisfied that the application in question complies with all the requirements of this Act and 
any other applicable law, it shall grant its approval in respect thereof; (b)(i) Is not so satisfied; or 
(ii) Is satisfied that the building to which the application in question relates – (aa) is to be erected 
in such a manner or will be of such nature or appearance that – (aaa) the area in which it is to be 
erected will probably or in fact be disfigured thereby; (bbb) it will probably or in fact be unsightly or 
objectionable; (ccc) it will probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining or neighbouring 
properties; (bb) will probably or in fact be dangerous to life or property, such local authority shall 
refuse to grant its approval in respect thereof and give written reasons for such refusal.”
66 The way in which a court interprets s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act plays an important role 
in its decision about whether or not such an application should be successful. In this regard, see the 
Walele case (n 9) par 54-56 (CC) and the True Motives case (n 20) par 20-24, 33-39, 46-48, 94-97 
(SCA), read with the Turnbull-Jackson case (n 20) (CC), and see the discussion below.
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that section 7 of the building act creates a substantive right to prevent the erection 
of buildings on a neighbouring property that obstruct an existing view, but there are 
decisions that indicate that there is no reason why a decision maker should consider 
enjoyment of the existing view from a neighbouring property as a substantive right 
when considering an application for the approval of building plans that otherwise 
comply with all applicable legislation and the zoning scheme.
67
 
The conflicting decisions in the Walele68 and True Motives cases69 created some 
confusion regarding the interpretation of section 7.
70
 As appears from 2 above, 
a landowner can prevent building on neighbouring land if she has a substantive 
property right to be informed of, to object against, and in some cases to withhold 
consent for, the approval of the relevant building plans.
71
 In principle, this substantive 
right can and should be exercised before building plans are approved. By contrast, 
the right to object against a neighbour’s building works in terms of section 7 comes 
into existence only once a local authority has exercised its discretion in terms of that 
section in a certain way (namely to approve the building plans), which shows that 
an attempt to prevent buildings on a neighbouring property in terms of this section 
amounts to a strategy based purely on procedural considerations.
72
The procedural strategies for objecting against building on neighbouring land 
can assume one of two forms. If a property owner attacks a potential threat to her 
existing view on the basis of irregularities in the process for approving a neighbour’s 
building plans, she has to prove only that there was non-compliance with a prescribed 
procedural requirement and that the approval was therefore unlawful.
73
 Conversely, 
if she attacks a decision maker’s exercise of a discretion in approving the building 
plans, interpretation of the provisions that grant the decision maker such a discretion 
comes into play. 
3.2 Procedural shortcomings
3.2.1 Application
The supreme court of appeal decision in Paola v Jeeva NO74 concerns a property 
owner’s attempt to attack a purely procedural shortcoming in the approval of 
a neighbour’s building plans as a strategy to prevent building works that would 





71 See the discussion of the Muller case (n 1) in 2.2.3; the Richardson case (n 12) in 2.2.2 and the 
Transnet case (n 12) in 2.2.4.
72 See the discussion of the Paola case (n 64); the Clark case (n 1); the De Kock case (n 1) in 3.3.1, 3.3.2.
73 The building act prescribes prerequisites for building to be valid. This includes that building plans 
must be submitted for approval by the relevant local authority (s 4) and that the local authority shall 
either grant or refuse approval of the plans after considering recommendations made by a building 
control officer (s 5-7). In the Paola case (n 19) there was no building control officer in the local 
authority’s service when the application was approved and the process did not comply with the 
requirements in s 5(1), 6(1), 7(1).
74 (n 19). The a quo decision (n 64) is discussed in 3.3.1. 
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obstruct the existing view from his property.75 The approval of the building plans 
contravened section 5(1) of the building act, which requires local authorities to 
appoint building control officers, and sections 6(1) and 7(1), which further require 
a local authority to consider the recommendations of such an officer, since no 
building control officer was employed by the relevant local authority at the time 
when the plans in question were approved.76 The court held that the appointment of 
a building control officer and a local authority’s consideration of such an officer’s 
recommendations constitute jurisdictional facts that are prerequisites for the lawful 
exercise of the statutory power to approve building plans.77 The supreme court of 
appeal consequently set the approval of the building plans aside on the ground that 
they were approved in terms of an unlawful administrative process.78
When the supreme court of appeal in Paola set the local authority’s decision to 
approve the first and second respondents’ building plans aside on the basis of the 
procedural shortcoming, the effect was that the respondents could not continue with 
the proposed building. This effectively prevented the obstruction of the existing 
view from the appellant’s property. However, because it was merely a procedural 
irregularity that temporarily stalled approval of the building plans, the prevention 
of the interference with the existing view from the appellant’s property was only 
temporary, since the shortcoming could be rectified and the plans could subsequently 
be approved lawfully, without the neighbours being able to object.
79
 This would be 
true of most, if not all, purely procedural attacks of this kind.
75 The case came before the SCA as an appeal against the dismissal of the appellant’s application 
for the review and setting aside of the third respondent’s decision to approve building plans for a 
neighbouring property. In the case a quo (n 64), the appellant (then the applicant) attacked the third 
respondent’s (local authority’s) approval of the building plans on the grounds that in terms of s 7(1)
(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act, the third respondent may not have approved the plans, since the 
proposed building’s size and position would probably or in fact cause the value of the appellant’s 
property to decrease; that the relevant official failed to apply her mind properly when she gave 
consideration to the plans; and that the plans did not comply with the town planning regulations 
regarding requirements that are set for rear spaces. Subsequently, the appellant discovered that the 
third respondent did not have a building control officer employed when the building plans were 
approved.
76 the Paola case (n 19) par 6-7.
77 the Paola case (n 19) par 11-16. In terms of s 5(1) of the building act a local authority must appoint 
a building control officer. Sec 6(1)(a) of the act provides that one of the functions of a building 
control officer is to make recommendations to a local authority regarding building plans, while s 7(1) 
requires a local authority to consider such recommendations when deciding whether or not to approve 
an application for building plans. In the Camps Bay case (n 17) par 14, 34, Griesel AJ followed the 
same reasoning that the supreme court of appeal would later rely on in the Paola case (n 19) par 11, 
namely that s 7(1) of the building act “requires a recommendation by the building control officer as 
a precondition for any decision to be taken by the City on an application for approval in terms of 
s 4”. In both the Walele case (n 9) par 55 and the True Motives case (n 20) par 21 the majority and 
the minority judgments accepted that in terms of a decision taken under s 7(1) of the building act, 
“recommendation” is a jurisdictional fact.
78 the Paola case (n 19) par 16. Kidd 2004 SALJ 556-558 argues that the court should have taken 
the intention of the legislature into account and that the objective of regulating the appointment 
and functions of a building control officer in s 5 and 6 of the building act is to maintain building 
standards. This objective will be served equally well when building plans are approved having 
considered recommendations by a building control officer or by a person with the same skills and 
expertise. In his view, the fact that the building plans in the Paola case had not been considered by 
a building control officer did therefore not necessarily constitute absence of a jurisdictional fact 
that rendered the building plans invalid. He concludes that the supreme court of appeal probably 
followed a too rigid approach in the Paola case, since the administrative process for the approval of 
the building plans did indeed serve the objective of maintaining building standards.
79 Kidd (n 78) 558.
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 like the supreme court of appeal’s decision in the Paola 
case,
81
 shows that a procedural shortcoming in the process of approving building 
plans may prevent the obstruction of the existing view from a property.82 In both 
these judgments, the courts set the approval of building plans aside because 
procedural irregularities rendered the approval processes unlawful. The courts’ 
rulings had the same effect in both cases, namely that the view from a neighbouring 
property was indirectly protected because the building plans, in terms of which a 
building that would interfere with such a view would be erected, were set aside. 
However, although these orders resulted in the indirect protection of the existing 
view from the respective properties, such protection was only temporary. In a case 
where a court sets the approval of building plans aside on a formal shortcoming, the 
irregularity can be rectified and the neighbour whose view will be affected by the 
proposed construction will still neither have the right to be informed if the plans 
are resubmitted, nor will she have the right to object against them, provided they 
comply with all formal and procedural requirements. Therefore, in cases where 
there has been a formal irregularity but where no substantive right of another person 
was affected, plans may be resubmitted and approved without informing neighbours 
of the “repeat procedure” or giving them the opportunity to participate in the 
(second) approval process. This means that the benefit that neighbours may derive 
from building plans being set aside because of purely procedural irregularities will 
probably at most result in the temporary “protection” of an existing view. 
3.3 Questioning a decision maker’s discretion
3.3.1 Application
The matter is more complicated when a procedural attack targets the exercise of a 
discretion in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act. In the a quo decision in 
Paola v Jeeva NO,83 the Durban and Coast local division considered an application 
to protect the view from the applicant’s property against obstruction caused by 
building on her neighbour’s property.
84
 The applicant maintained that view is a 
factor that should be taken into account when determining the value of a property
85
 
and that the approval of the respondents’ building plans was inconsistent with 
section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act because execution of the plans would obstruct 
the view from his property and consequently cause the property to depreciate. 
According to the applicant’s interpretation of this provision, the value of a property 
includes a value that is attributable to the view from the property. Therefore, a local 
authority should consider whether or not a proposed building would obstruct the 
80 (n 1).
81 (n 19), discussed in 3.2.1.
82 the Muller case (n 1) par 55, 57, 58, 61, 64, 67, 68. The court set aside the approval of the second 
respondent’s building plans, inter alia, on the ground that the local authority that approved the plans 
used the wrong method for determining the height of the proposed building works. The decision 
is discussed in 2.2.3 as an example of a neighbouring owner’s right to be heard when a building 
plan involves a departure from the applicable zoning scheme, and in 3.3.2 as an illustration of the 
argument that the existing view from a property contributes to the property’s value.
83 (n 64).
84 The respondents were trustees of a trust that owned property adjacent to the applicant’s property. 
The applicant lodged an application for approval of the respondents’ building plans to be set aside. 
The building plans provided for the construction of a double-storey residence.
85 the Paola case (n 64) 395.
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view from a neighbouring property before approving the relevant building plans. 
The respondents argued that view has no value for planning purposes and that 
the development of the respondents’ property should therefore not be prohibited 
to preserve the applicant’s view. The respondents argued that section 7(1)(b)(ii)
(aa)(ccc) concerns the general effect that the erection of a building would have on 
neighbouring or adjoining properties, and not its effect on a specific property.86
The court rejected the applicant’s interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii), reasoning 
that if the applicant’s interpretation was followed, property owners would be treated 
according to the order in which their respective properties were developed.
87
 Such an 
interpretation would result in the arbitrary treatment of owners and would therefore 
be inconsistent with the constitutional demands for the promotion of equality and 
rationality.
88
 The court approved of the respondents’ argument that protection of the 
right to an existing view89 would cause chaos and confusion in the world of property 
development.
90
 Furthermore, protection of the right to a view may harm the effective 




The applicant in the Paola case did not have a substantive right to protect the 
existing view from his property, since this view was not protected with a servitude 
or a restrictive condition and he was not aware of any procedural or substantive 
irregularities regarding the approval of his neighbour’s building plans. Consequently, 
he relied on the argument that the erection of a building that will obstruct the 
existing view from his property will affect his property’s market value.92 When the 
court rejected this argument, the applicant appealed.
93
 During the appeal, it became 
apparent that a purely procedural irregularity indeed rendered the approval of the 
plans unlawful from the outset.
94
 The supreme court of appeal accordingly set the 
86 the Paola case (n 64) 403-404.
87 If s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act is interpreted the way in which the applicant suggested, namely 
that a pleasant view enhances the value of a property, it would have the effect that an owner who 
develops her property first would be able to object to the building plans of all owners who develop 
their property later.
88 the Paola case (n 64) 404 406. Kondile J referred to S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 156, 
where Ackermann J concluded that “[a]rbitrary action or decision-making is incapable of providing 
a rational explanation as to why similarly placed persons are treated in a substantially different way.” 
89 The applicant’s interpretation of s 7(1)(b)(ii) effectively promoted a right to a view.
90 This was the professional opinion of the architect instructed by the respondents. See the Paola case 
(n 64) 397 and 406. A similar argument was made by Lord Blackburn in the English case of Dalton 
v Angus (1881) 6 AC 740 (HL) 24 par C, who reasoned that prospect should not be acquired through 
prescription because such a way of acquiring the right to have a view would inhibit the development 
of towns. According to Lord Blackburn, acknowledgment of a right to a view would have a negative 
effect on urban development. See Van der Walt and Kriek (n 1) 482-515, where comparisons are 
drawn between the acknowledgement of a right to a view in South African, English and Dutch law.
91 the Paola case (n 64) 406. Cf the Clark case (n 1); Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality (1237/09) 2009 
ZAWCHC 10 (13 Feb 2009) par 10.
92 The applicants in the Ramdass case (n 64) relied on a similar argument in an attempt to have the 
approval of building plans for a neighbouring property reviewed. They reasoned that the relevant 
local authority was, in terms of s 7 (1)(b)(ii) of the building act, obliged to refuse to approve the 
building plans for building works on a neighbouring property, since the proposed building would, 
upon completion, derogate from the value of their (applicants’) properties, limit their existing 
views and affect their privacy. The court dismissed the application and described the applicants’ 
strategy to prevent the obstruction of their existing views as a “determined effect to stop or delay the 
construction”. See par 8, 12, 32.
93 the Paola case (n 19). The appeal decision is discussed in 3.2.1.
94 See 3.2.1.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 1 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
38 KRIEK AND VAN DER WALT
approval of the second respondent’s building plans aside because of this procedural 
irregularity. 
However, the supreme court of appeal nevertheless commented on the question 
whether or not building plans that propose a building that would obstruct the 
existing view from a neighbouring property cause a “derogation from the value” 
of a neighbouring property that renders the plans unfit for approval in terms of 
section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc).
95
 The court was of the opinion that the word “value” 
should be given its ordinary meaning of market value and that the wording used by 
the legislature cannot be understood to exclude the value that flows from a view that 
can be enjoyed from a property. Therefore, if it is clear that the execution of certain 
building plans will cause a depreciation of an adjoining property, the plans should, 
according to the wording of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), not be approved.
96
 This 
interpretation of section 7, namely that a local authority may approve building plans 
only if it is satisfied that none of the undesirable outcomes mentioned in section 
7(1)(b)(ii) would eventuate once the building is complete, might have created the 




 submits that the supreme court of appeal’s decision in the Paola 
case is often mistakenly cited as authority for the proposition that South African 
courts regard the view from a property as an actionable right. In fact, the court did 
not make a binding ruling on this issue, since the ratio of the decision concerned the 
purely procedural shortcoming regarding the non-appointment of a building control 
officer.98 Kidd also argues that the decision in the Paola case does not “constitute 
a radical new direction for neighbour law”.
99
 According to Kidd, there are certain 
instances where the “social utility of a development should outweigh the market 
value of a particular property”.
100
 He argues that, in terms of the supreme court of 
appeal’s judgment in the Paola case, section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the act compels 
a local authority to reject building plans if such plans will have a negative effect 
on the market value of a neighbouring property. The decision to reject such plans 
will therefore take place without any consideration being given to the wider social 
95 the Paola case (n 19) par 17, 19, 20. The court was requested by counsel for all the parties to give its 
opinion on this matter. The appellant did not contend to have the right to a view, but he argued that 
he had the right that plans for building on neighbouring property may not be approved unless all the 
statutory requirements have been complied with. See n 96 below. 
96 the Paola case (n 19) par 23. This view contravened the finding of the court a quo (n 64) 406. Kondile 
J, in the court a quo, dismissed the notion that the pleasurable view from a property should be 
afforded protection because it may attribute to the value of a property. 
97 (n 1) 364.
98 In the True Motives case (n 20) par 25-35 the supreme court of appeal held that the remark made by 
the court in the Paola case (n 19) regarding the protection of the view from a property was obiter. In 
the Searle case (n 91) par 13 the Cape high court agreed that the judgment in the Paola case did not 
establish a right to an existing view. In this regard, see Van der Walt (n 1) 366, 371, 376. Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert (n 1) 127 cite the Paola case as authority for the principle that a property owner 
is not entitled to claim a right to a view. However, Kritzinger 2004 THRHR 150-153 reasons that 
the Paola case established that a property owner does have the right to protect the view from her 
property.
99 Kidd (n 78) 556.
100 Kidd (n 78) 562.
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interests that may be served by the development.
101
 Since the supreme court of 
appeal’s consideration of section 7 of the act merely resulted in an obiter remark, 
this ruling did not establish that the possible obstruction of the existing view from 
a neighbouring property is a factor that must be taken into account when a local 
authority decides whether or not to approve building plans. The decision can 
therefore not be considered authority for the proposition that section 7 creates a 
substantive right to prevent the erection of a building on a neighbouring property. 
This conclusion is underlined by subsequent decisions.
3.3.2 Remedies
In the New Adventure Investments judgment,102 the Western Cape high court 
indirectly acknowledged that the view from a property may in certain circumstances 
contribute to the property’s market value. However, the court a quo in the Paola 
case,
103
 as well as the courts in Clark v Faraday
104
 and De Kock v Saldanhabaai 
Munisipaliteit,
105
 ruled that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act does not 
compel a local authority to consider the possibility that the execution of building 
plans may obstruct the view from a neighbouring property.
106
 By implication, this 
provision does not create a substantive right to prevent the approval of building 
plans, and consequently the erection of building works on a neighbouring property, 
as long as such plans comply with applicable legislation, building regulations and 
the relevant zoning scheme. The Muller decision
107 underlines the qualification to 
this principle: building plans will cause neighbouring properties to depreciate if 
and insofar as they do not comply with the prescribed height limitations.
108
 In that 
perspective, section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) does prohibit the approval of building plans if 
they contravene legislation or the applicable zoning scheme and their execution will 
therefore cause a relevant decrease in the value of the property for purposes of this 
section if the building results in obstructing the view from neighbouring properties. 
101 Kidd (n 78) 561 proposes that this potential problem could be dealt with in one of two ways. Firstly, 
“value of adjoining properties” could be interpreted as the value of the community as a whole. 
Secondly, the building act could be amended to ensure that a decision maker considers the social 
utility of a proposed development as a positive factor to be weighed against the negative impact that 
the development may have on the market value of a particular neighbouring owner’s property. He 
comments that his first proposition is not a good solution, since it is a “strained” interpretation and 
does not give effect to the plain meaning of the words.
102 New Adventure Investments193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust 2002 3 All SA 
544 (C). The plaintiff instituted action against the defendant for cancellation of a deed of sale, since 
the defendant sold him a piece of property without informing him that a development was planned 
for the property right in front of the object of the sale. He also argued that a prospective buyer of 
a sea-fronting property would be influenced by the fact that a development that would obstruct the 
views from such a property is planned for a neighbouring property. He alleged that the defendant’s 
fraudulent non-disclosure of this information constituted a sufficient basis for cancellation of 
the contract. The court concluded that the view from the sale property was of great importance 
to a prospective purchaser and to the plaintiff in particular and decided that the erection of the 
proposed block of flats would seriously impede this view and that the plaintiff’s decision to contract 
would have been affected if he had knowledge of the fact that there was a real possibility of such a 
development. The non-disclosure was therefore considered to be germane to the sale of the property. 
See par 1-3, 6, 35-37, 42-43, 69.
103 (n 64), see 3.3.1.
104 (n 1).
105 (n 1).
106 See n 117 for a discussion of the Clark and De Kock courts’ interpretations of s 7(1)(b)(ii).
107 (n 1), see 2.2.3.
108 the Muller case (n 1) par 75. 
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The scope and implications of the Muller decision should therefore be considered 
carefully. The decision to set aside approval of the building plans was based on 
the irregular approval of the plans,
109
 and not purely on the fact that the completed 
building would possibly cause the value of a neighbouring property to depreciate.
110
 
Significantly, the decision does not imply that the approval of building plans may 
be refused generally on the basis that such plans would cause a depreciation of 
neighbouring properties in the form of obstructing their existing views. It merely 
confirms that a formal shortcoming in the process of approving building plans111 or 
building plans that contravene the applicable legislation, zoning scheme or building 
regulations and that therefore derogate from the value of adjoining properties may 
render the approval of such plans unlawful.
112
 
The decision of the court a quo in the Paola
113
 as well as the rulings in the Clark
114
 
and De Kock cases
115
 indicate that courts are reluctant to acknowledge the obstruction 
of the existing view from a property as a factor that may decrease the value of the 
property and therefore render building plans that will cause such an obstruction unfit 
for approval.
116
 These decisions indicate that there is no easy remedy for a property 
owner who attempts to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property 
with an attack on the relevant local authority’s decision to approve building plans. 
Local authorities do not consider the fact that such building plans may amount to a 
depreciation of the value of neighbouring properties, since property owners do not 
have a substantive right – nor is such a right created by section 7 of the building act 
– to prevent the erection of buildings on neighbouring properties, unless they are 
entitled or obliged to do so in terms of a servitude, restrictive condition, legislation, 
building regulations or the applicable zoning scheme.
117 To the extent that some 
109 See 3.2.2, 2.2.3.
110 Van der Walt (n 1) 368-369 reasons that the court in the Muller case protected the applicants 
against the negative impact that the unlawful approval procedure had and not against the impact 
of the obstruction of their view. He adds that even if the view would not have been blocked by the 
construction, the plans could have been reviewed because they were wrongfully approved.
111 See 3.2.2.
112 See 2.2.3.
113 the Paola case (n 64), see 3.3.1.
114 the Clark case (n 1).
115 the De Kock case (n 1).
116 See n 117 for a discussion of the interpretations of s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act in the Clark case (n 
1) and the De Kock case (n 1).
117 In the Clark case (n 1), the court ruled that s 7(1)(b)(ii) should be interpreted restrictively to prevent 
it from having the effect of prohibiting the erection of a building purely because it would cause 
the obstruction of the view from a neighbouring property. According to Van der Westhuizen AJ, 
the (indirect) protection of the right to a view would be in conflict with the rules and regulations 
regarding the creation and extinction of praedial servitudes. Moreover, such protection would impair 
an owner’s common law right to build as high as she likes, within the formal restrictions laid down 
by law and in the applicable zoning and building regulations. Supporting the judgment in the Clark 
case and the supreme court of appeal’s decision in the Paola case, Klopper AJ in the De Kock case 
(n 1) concluded that the value that is referred to in s 7 of the building act is the market value of a 
property. Market value is based on the price that an informed and willing buyer is prepared to pay 
to an informed and willing seller for the relevant property. In par 43-45 the judge argued that an 
informed buyer would realise that a property owner does not have an inherent right to a view and 
would therefore not attach much value to the existing view from a property. This ruling confirms 
that s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the act does not indirectly acknowledge a right to an existing view from 
a property. By implication, s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act does not compel a local authority 
to consider, when deciding whether or not to approve building plans, that the execution of such plans 
might interfere with a neighbour’s existing view. According to the De Kock court’s interpretation 
of s 7 of the act, a local authority is obliged to approve building plans if they comply with the 
relevant legal provisions. Similarly, the court in the Searle case (n 91) par 10 decided that a local 
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decisions
118
 seem to indicate that property owner A can successfully prevent building 
on neighbouring property B when the building would cause a decrease in the value 
of A’s property, they were decided on the basis of the unlawfulness of the building 
plans or an irregularity in the approval of the plans.
119
 Section 7 of the building act 
does therefore not create a substantive right to prevent building purely on the basis 
that the building would diminish the value of neighbouring property by obstructing 
the existing, unobstructed view from that property.
4 Conclusion
In the absence of a servitude to protect the undisturbed, existing view from a 
property, alternative strategies are often relied on to prevent building that will 
interfere with such a view. Case law shows that South African property owners 
rely on three alternative strategies that may result in the indirect protection of their 
existing views. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on whether or not 
they are based on a substantive right to prevent building works on a neighbouring 
property; a purely procedural shortcoming during the approval of a neighbour’s 
building plans; or an attack on the discretion exercised when a decision maker 
approved the building plans.
authority has a statutory duty to enforce the applicable legislation and zoning scheme when deciding 
whether or not to approve building plans. Although s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) prohibits a local authority 
from approving building plans if their execution will result in a decrease of another property’s value, 
this does not indirectly afford a property owner a right to the existing view from her property. The 
Searle court’s interpretation of “market value” resembles that of the court in the De Kock case. In 
the De Kock case, the court argued that a willing and informed buyer would be aware of the fact that 
the owner of property does not have an inherent right to or protection of the view from a property 
and would therefore not attach much value to it. Similarly, in the Searle case, the court reasoned 
that a notional informed buyer would be aware of the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
the property that she wishes to buy and, accordingly, a notional willing buyer of a property with 
a view of the ocean will take the possibility that this view may be obstructed into consideration 
before determining the price that she is willing to pay. See the Searle case (n 91) par 13; the De 
Kock case (n 1) par 44-45. See also the True Motives case (n 20) par 30, 120, and Van der Walt (n 
1) 376. The constitutional court confirmed this definition and implications of the word “value” in 
s 7. In the Camps Bay case (n 17) par 38-40, the constitutional court explained the applicability of 
the word “value” within the context of this provision, confirming that it refers to “market value”. 
Market value, it was held, is determined by the price that an informed buyer will pay an informed 
seller, taking into account the potential risks that threaten the subject property. The constitutional 
court specifically referred to the potential risk that the view from a property may be obstructed by 
later development on a neighbouring property. Where such a view directly affects the value of the 
property (for example, a sea-fronting property), the informed buyer would give due consideration to 
the potential that it may be obstructed and adjust the price that she is willing to pay accordingly. The 
court continued that an informed buyer would also consider the limitations that may be applicable to 
such a potential new development. However, limitations that restrictive conditions, town planning 
and zoning schemes and legislation impose on a neighbour’s building works would usually not affect 
the market value of a property, because it would effectively be a realisation of a risk that was already 
accounted for. The constitutional court concluded that this interpretation of the word “value” in s 7 
implies that development (building work) on property A that affects an attribute that was previously 
enjoyed from property B will not, in itself, diminish the value of property B. It held that s 7(1)
(b)(ii) comes into play only when a new building complies with legally imposed restrictions, but 
its unattractive or intrusive appearance exceeds the legitimate expectations of the parties to the 
hypothetical sale. In other words, this provision will not protect a property owner if the value of her 
property has depreciated because of reasonable and lawful development on a neighbouring property, 
but only if such a development exceeds her legitimate expectations.
118 the Muller case (n 1); the Paola case (n 19).
119 See the discussion of the Muller case (n 1) and the Paola case (n 19) in 3.2.2.
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The most successful alternative strategy to prevent obstruction of the view from 
a property is to rely on a substantive right, flowing from ownership of that property, 
to be informed of, to comment on, and sometimes to object against or even prevent 
building on neighbouring property. Such a substantive right can be enforced when 
a neighbour’s application for approval of her building plans involves the removal or 
amendment of a restrictive condition; requires the re-zoning or subdivision of land 
in the vicinity; entails a departure from the applicable zoning scheme; or when a 
property owner that would be affected by such an approval has a statutory duty to 
protect the direct line of view to or from a specific property. In these circumstances, 
a property owner is entitled to be informed of and to comment on (and possibly 
to object against) applications for the approval of neighbours’ building plans and 
thus possibly to protect the existing view from her property indirectly. Such a 
substantive right gives an owner the opportunity to object against and, in some 
instances, to veto approval of building plans that may interfere with the existing 
views from her property. A substantive right also entitles the beneficiary landowner 
to appeal against the approval of neighbours’ building plans if they had been denied 
the opportunity to object against or veto approval of those plans. 
A substantive right to prevent building on neighbouring properties may be an 
effective remedy to permanently protect the existing view to or from a property if 
the holder of such a right can provide sufficient reasons why the proposed building 
works should not be erected. In the Muller case,
120
 the court indicated that a 
substantive right to prevent building on a neighbouring property can indeed prevent 
the obstruction of the existing view from a property, at least insofar as the applicable 
building regulations, zoning scheme or restrictive conditions prohibit building 
works that would interfere with such view. Furthermore, the decision in the Transnet 
case
121
 shows that a court will be prepared to enforce a substantive statutory right 
or duty to protect an undisturbed, existing view even if it will permanently prevent 
neighbouring owners from exercising their right to develop their properties. 
A less effective strategy indirectly to prevent obstruction of the existing view from 
property is to object to the approval of a neighbour’s building plans on the ground 
that there was a procedural shortcoming in the approval process. In both the Muller 
case
122
 and the supreme court of appeal’s decision in the Paola case,
123
 the approval 
of building plans was declared unlawful and set aside on the basis of procedural 
irregularities in the approval process. The irregular approval of building plans does 
not entitle neighbouring owners to raise objections that may result in an absolute 
prohibition against proposed building, and will merely temporarily stall building 
works and prevent the obstruction of neighbours’ views until the irregularity has 
been rectified. This strategy is therefore less effective than the strategy based on a 
substantive right. 
The least useful strategy to prevent building that would obstruct the existing view 
from property is based on an attack against a local authority’s discretion to approve 
building plans. This kind of attack is usually based on the argument that the existing 
view from a property contributes to the property’s market value and that section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the building act prohibits a local authority from approving 
building plans that will cause a decrease in the value of the neighbouring property. 
120 the Muller case (n 1).
121 the Transnet case (n 12).
122 the Muller case (n 1).
123 the Paola case (n 19). The a quo decision (n 64) is discussed in 3.3.1.
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This strategy has been rejected in the court a quo in the Paola case
124
 as well as in 
the rulings in the Clark
125
 and De Kock cases.
126
 However, in an obiter remark in 
the supreme court of appeal’s judgment in the Paola case
127
 the court seemingly 
suggested that building plans should, according to the wording of section 7(1)(b)(ii)
(aa)(ccc) of the building act, not be approved if it is clear that their execution will 
cause a decrease in the value of an adjoining property.
128
 This may have created the 
impression that a property owner has an indirect right to the existing view from 
her property. Furthermore, in Muller NO v City of Cape Town,129 the court upheld 
the applicants’ argument that their neighbour’s building plans should not have been 
approved because the proposed building would cause a decrease in the value of 
their own property. Nevertheless, the court accepted only that the proposed building 
would cause the neighbouring property to depreciate insofar as it would exceed the 
prescribed height limitations, thus indicating that the real ground for the successful 
objection was failure to comply with the substantive right of neighbouring owners’ 
that plans should comply with building regulations.
130
 
A property owner who wants to protect the existing view from her property will 
attack a local authority’s discretion to approve a neighbour’s building plan only 
as a strategy of last resort. Her first option will be to rely on a substantive right to 
prevent a neighbour’s building works, or an attack on a procedural irregularity in 
the approval of her neighbour’s building plans. The strategy based on a substantive 
right is based on a pre-existing property right to prevent building on a neighbouring 
property, while the strategy in terms of which a procedural irregularity is attacked 
is based on the right to lawful administrative action. Both a pre-existing right to 
prevent building and a right to lawful administrative action must be enforced by 
courts. By contrast, the strategy to question an administrator’s decision to approve 
building plans relies on a court’s willingness to pass judgment on an administrator’s 
exercise of her discretion. Courts are generally unwilling to acknowledge the 
existing view from a neighbouring property as a factor that should be considered 
when a decision maker decides whether or not to approve building plans. Therefore, 
the latter strategy is the least effective way of protecting the view from a property in 
the sense that there can be no certainty that a court will order that approved building 
plans should be set aside or resubmitted on the basis of the discretion exercised in 
approving the plans.
124 the Paola case (n 64), discussed in 3.3.1.
125 the Clark case (n 1), see n 117.
126 the De Kock case (n 1), see n 117.
127 the Paola case (n 19). 
128 A related but separate question, namely whether s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the building act obliges a local 
authority that is in doubt whether a proposed building would derogate from the value of adjoining 
properties to approve or to reject the building plans, was settled in the Turnbull-Jackson case (n 
20). In the Walele case (n 9) the constitutional court decided that the local authority must, in case of 
doubt, reject the plans; in the True Motives case (n 20) the supreme court of appeal held that it had to 
approve the plans. In Turnbull-Jackson the constitutional court upheld its Walele interpretation of s 
7(2)(b)(ii), rejected the conflicting interpretation of the supreme court of appeal in the True Motives 
case, and held that it is not unjustifiably burdensome on either the local authority or the developing 
owner to expect the local authority to reject building plans when it is uncertain whether a completed 
building (that otherwise complies with all legal requirements) might trigger any of the disqualifying 
factors (including derogating of the value of neighbouring properties). See n 20.
129 (n 1).
130 the Muller case (n 1) par 75. 
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44 KRIEK AND VAN DER WALT
SAMEVATTING
ALTERNATIEWE STRATEGIEË OM ’N BESTAANDE UITSIG VANAF ’N EIENDOM TE 
BESKERM
Die outeurs neem as vertrekpunt die beginsel dat daar in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geen reg op die behoud 
of beskerming van ’n bestaande uitsig vanaf ’n grondstuk oor aanliggende eiendomme bestaan nie. In 
die afwesigheid van ’n serwituut wat bouwerk op aanliggende grond verbied of dermate beperk om die 
bestaande uitsig vanaf die heersende erf te beskerm, steun grondeienaars soms op ’n aantal alternatiewe 
strategieë om die bestaande uitsig vanaf hulle eiendom teen bouwerk op aanliggende grond te beskerm.
Die suksesvolste alternatiewe strategie steun op ’n substantiewe reg, wat deel vorm van die 
grondeienaar se eiendomsreg, om ingelig te word, geleentheid te kry om kommentaar te lewer op, 
beswaar te maak teen of selfs om die goedkeuring van planne vir bouwerk op aanliggende grond te 
veto. Hierdie substantiewe reg kom slegs voor wanneer goedkeuring van die planne en uitvoering 
van die voorgestelde bouwerk wysiging of verwydering van ’n beperkende voorwaarde; hersonering 
of onderverdeling van die aanliggende grond; of ’n afwyking of vrystelling van die geldende 
soneringsplan behels; of wanneer die beswaarmaker ’n statutêre reg of plig het om die direkte uitsig 
vanaf of op sy eiendom teen bouwerk op omringende eiendomme te handhaaf. In bepaalde gevalle 
is dit moontlik om beperkende voorwaardes wat bouwerk op aanliggende grond verbied of beperk 
ingevolge die gemenereg of wetgewing te wysig of op te hef en soms kan die verantwoordelike plaaslike 
of provinsiale owerheid die beswaarmakende eienaar se besware van die hand wys of die bouwerk in 
stryd daarmee goedkeur. Oor die algemeen is dit egter moontlik dat ’n grondeienaar met ’n beroep op 
een van hierdie substantiewe regte sy bestaande uitsig indirek, maar effektief en soms selfs permanent, 
kan handhaaf deur bouwerk op naburige grond te verhoed of te beperk.
’n Minder suksesvolle strategie is om in die afwesigheid van substantiewe regte, op suiwer 
prosedurele gronde teen die goedkeuring van planne vir bouwerk op naburige grond beswaar te maak. 
Indien goedkeuring van die planne inderdaad prosedureel gebrekkig was, kan die beswaarmaker 
bouwerk wat met sy bestaande uitsig sal inmeng op hierdie manier vertraag. Die remedie sal egter altyd 
slegs tydelik van aard wees aangesien die prosedurele tekortkoming gewoonlik reggestel kan word, 
waarna die bouwerk sonder beswaar sou kon voortgaan.
Die mins suksesvolle strategie om bouwerk te voorkom wat ’n bestaande uitsig sal versper, berus 
op ’n aanval teen die diskresie wat die plaaslike bestuur uitoefen wanneer dit bouplanne goedkeur. Die 
howe is onwillig om die effek wat goedkeuring van bouplanne op die bestaande uitsig van naburige 
eiendom het as ’n faktor in ag te neem wat die uitoefening van die diskresie inkort. Daarom sal hierdie 
strategie ook hoogstens effektief wees wanneer dit met ’n substantiewe grond vir beswaar of met 
prosedurele tekortkominge in die goedkeuringsproses gepaard gaan. Op sigself, in die afwesigheid van 
een van die substantiewe gronde, is die feit dat bouwerk op naburige eiendom ’n bestaande uitsig sal 
belemmer, egter nie ’n geldige grond waarop uitoefening van die plaaslike owerheid se diskresie om 
bouplanne goed te keur, aangeval kan word nie.
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